Security Engineering Associates

Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f, which requires the Department of State to provide an annual report to Congress on terrorism, requires the report to include, inter alia, information on terrorist groups and umbrella groups under which any terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years; groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism about which Congress was notified during the past year in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act; and any other known international terrorist group that the Secretary of State determined should be the subject of the report. The list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) below is followed by a list of other selected terrorist groups also deemed of relevance in the global war on terrorism.

17 November

Operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beka’a Valley, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in

Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.

External Aid

Receives financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran, and

diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria. Hizballah also receives funding from charitable donations

and business interests.

Pakistan. JEM maintained training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of 2001.

Most of JEM’s cadre and material resources have been drawn from the militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). JEM had close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to JEM. JEM also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, JEM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.

Jemaah Islamiya Organization is responsible for numerous high-profile bombings, including the bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on August 5, 2003, and the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002. Members of the group have also been implicated in the September 9, 2004, attack outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The Bali attack, which left more than 200 dead, was reportedly the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks in Singapore and against soft targets such as tourist spots were also considered. In June 2003, authorities disrupted a JI plan to attack several Western

embassies and tourist sites in Thailand. In December 2001, Singaporean authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. JI is also responsible for the coordinated bombings of numerous Christian churches in Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000  and was involved in the bombings of several targets in Manila on December 31, 2000. The capture in August 2003 of Indonesian Riduan bin Isomoddin (a.k.a. Hambali), JI leader and al-Qa’ida Southeast Asia operations chief, damaged the JI, but the group maintains its ability to target Western interests in the region and to recruit new members through a network of radical Islamic schools based primarily in Indonesia. The emir, or spiritual leader, of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, was on trial at year’s end on charges of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, and for his links to the Bali and Jakarta Marriott bombings and to a cache of arms and explosives found in central Java.

Exact numbers are unknown, but Southeast Asian authorities

continue to uncover and arrest JI elements. Estimates

of total JI members vary widely from the hundreds to the

thousands.

JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines.

Investigations indicate that JI is fully capable of its own

fundraising, although it also receives financial, ideological,

and logistical support from Middle Eastern and South

Asian contacts, non-governmental organizations, and

other groups.

a.k.a. Jihad Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ

This Egyptian Islamic extremist group merged with Usama

Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization in 2001. Usama Bin

Ladin’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was the former head

of AJ. Active since the 1970s, AJ’s primary goal has been

the overthrow of the Egyptian Government and the establishment

of an Islamic state. The group’s primary

targets, historically, have been high-level Egyptian Government

officials as well as US and Israeli interests in Egypt

and abroad. Regular Egyptian crackdowns on extremists,

including on AJ, have greatly reduced AJ capabilities

in Egypt.

The original AJ was responsible for the 1981 assassination

of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. It claimed

responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior

Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister

Atef Sedky in November 1993. AJ has not conducted

an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never successfully

targeted foreign tourists there. The group was

responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in

Islamabad in 1995 and a disrupted plot against the US

Embassy in Albania in 1998.

Unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core

members inside and outside of Egypt.

Historically AJ operated in the Cairo area. Most AJ members

today are outside Egypt in countries such as

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and

Yemen. AJ activities have been centered outside Egypt

for several years under the auspices of al-Qa’ida.

Unknown. Since 1998 AJ received most of its funding

from al-Qa’ida, and these close ties culminated in the

eventual merger of the groups. Some funding may come

from various Islamic non-governmental organizations,

cover businesses, and criminal acts.

Kach’s stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel.

Kach, founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir

Kahane, and its offshoot Kahane Chai, (translation:

“Kahane Lives”), founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin

following his father’s 1990 assassination in the United

States, were declared to be terrorist organizations in 1994

by the Israeli Cabinet under its 1948 Terrorism Law. This

followed the groups’ statements in support of Dr. Baruch

Goldstein’s attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi

Mosque (Goldstein was affiliated with Kach) and their

verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gunmen

killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by

shooting in December 2000 in the West Bank.

The group has organized protests against the Israeli Government.

Kach has harassed and threatened Arabs,

Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials, and has

vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his

wife. Kach is suspected of involvement in a number of

low-level attacks since the start of the al-Aqsa intifadah

in 2000. Known Kach sympathizers are becoming more

vocal and active against the planned Israeli withdrawal

from the Gaza Strip in mid-2005.

Unknown.

Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba’

in Hebron.

Receives support from sympathizers in the United States

and Europe.

a.k.a. Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, Kurdistan Freedom

and Democracy Congress, KADEK, Kurdistan

People’s Congress, Freedom and Democracy Congress

of Kurdistan

The Kongra-Gel was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974

as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization and formally

named the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 1978. The group,

composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, began its campaign

of armed violence in 1984, which has resulted in some

30,000 casualties. The PKK’s goal has been to establish

an independent, democratic Kurdish state in southeast

Turkey, northern Iraq, and parts of Iran and Syria. In the

early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent

activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish

authorities captured Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999, and

the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced

him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a

“peace initiative,” ordering members to refrain from violence

and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish

issues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, members

supported Ocalan’s initiative and claimed the group now

would use only political means to achieve its public goal

of improved rights for Kurds in Turkey. In April 2002 at its

8th Party Congress, the PKK changed its name to the

Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK)

and proclaimed a commitment to non-violent activities

in support of Kurdish rights. In late 2003, the group sought

to engineer another political face-lift, renaming itself

Kongra-Gel (KGK) and promoting its “peaceful” intentions

while continuing to conduct attacks in “self-defense” and

to refuse disarmament. After five years, the group’s hardline

militant wing, the People’s Defense Force (HPG),

renounced its self-imposed cease-fire on June 1, 2004.

Over the course of the cease-fire, the group had divided

into two factions – politically-minded reformists, and

hardliners who advocated a return to violence. The

hardliners took control of the group in February 2004.

Primary targets have been Turkish Government security

forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose

the organization in Turkey. It conducted attacks on Turkish

diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West

European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an

attempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the then-PKK

bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign

tourists in the early-to-mid-1990s. While most of the

group’s violence in 2004 was directed toward Turkish security

forces, KGK was likely responsible for an

unsuccessful July car bomb attack against the governor

of Van Province, although it publicly denied responsibility,

and may have played a role in the August bombings

of two Istanbul hotels and a gas complex in which two

people died.

Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, 3,000 to 3,500 of whom

currently are located in northern Iraq. The group has thousands

of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe. In November,

Dutch police raided a suspected KGK training camp in The

Netherlands, arresting roughly 30 suspected members.

Operates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, Europe, and the

Middle East.

Has received safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq,

and Iran. Syria and Iran appear to cooperate with Turkey

against KGK in a limited fashion when it serves their immediate

interests. KGK uses Europe for fundraising and

conducting political propaganda.

a.k.a. Army of the Righteous, Lashkar-e-Toiba, al

Monsooreen, al-Mansoorian, Army of the Pure, Army

of the Righteous, Army of the Pure and Righteous

LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization,

Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), an

anti-US Sunni missionary organization formed in 1989.

LT is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and is one of the

three largest and best trained groups fighting in Kashmir

against India. It is not connected to any political party.

The Pakistani Government banned the group and froze

its assets in January 2002. Elements of LT and Jaish-e-

Mohammed combined with other groups to mount attacks

as “The Save Kashmir Movement.”

LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian

troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since

1993. LT claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in

2001, including an attack in January on Srinagar airport

that killed five Indians; an attack on a police station in

Srinagar that killed at least eight officers and wounded

several others; and an attack in April against Indian border

security forces that left at least four dead. The Indian

Government publicly implicated LT, along with JEM, for

the attack on December 13, 2001, on the Indian Parliament

building, although concrete evidence is lacking. LT

is also suspected of involvement in the attack on May 14,

2002, on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that left 36

dead. Senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was

captured at an LT safe house in Faisalabad in March 2002,

suggesting some members are facilitating the movement

of al-Qa’ida members in Pakistan.

Has several thousand members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan,

in the southern Jammu and Kashmir and Doda

regions, and in the Kashmir valley. Almost all LT members

are Pakistanis from madrassas across Pakistan or

Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars.

Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad.

Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the

Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and

Pakistani and other Kashmiri business people. LT also

maintains a Web site (under the name Jamaat ud-Daawa),

through which it solicits funds and provides information

on the group’s activities. The amount of LT funding is unknown.

LT maintains ties to religious/militant groups

around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the

Middle East and Chechnya through the fraternal network

of its parent organization Jamaat ud-Dawa (formerly

Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad). In anticipation of asset seizures

by the Pakistani Government, the LT withdrew funds from

bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as

commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer

goods.

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni

sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses primarily

on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani

President Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort to

rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then

sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom

they had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban, LJ

members became active in aiding other terrorists with

safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani

cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. In

January 2003, the United States added LJ to the list of

Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings. The group

attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister of

Punjab Province, in January 1999. Pakistani authorities

have publicly linked LJ members to the kidnap and murder

of US journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002. Police

officials initially suspected LJ members were involved in

the two suicide car bombings in Karachi in 2002 against

a French shuttle bus in May and the US Consulate in June,

but their subsequent investigations have not led to any LJ

members being charged in the attacks. Similarly, press

reports have linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in

Pakistan, including a grenade assault on the Protestant

International Church in Islamabad in March 2002 that

killed two US citizens, but no formal charges have been

filed against the group. Pakistani authorities believe LJ

was responsible for the bombing in July 2003 of a Shiite

mosque in Quetta, Pakistan. Authorities have also implicated

LJ in several sectarian incidents in 2004, including

the May and June bombings of two Shiite mosques in

Karachi that killed over 40 people.

Probably fewer than 100.

LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members

travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Unknown.

a.k.a. The Tamil Tigers, The Ellalan Force

Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil

group in Sri Lanka. It began its insurgency against the Sri

Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla

strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The

LTTE currently is observing a cease-fire agreement with

the Sri Lankan Government.

The LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy

with a terrorist program that targets key personnel in the

countryside and senior Sri Lankan political and military

leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The LTTE is

most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black

Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings were commonplace

tactics prior to the cease-fire.

Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to

have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka,

with a core of 3,000 to 6,000 trained fighters. The LTTE also

has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising,

weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

The LTTE controls most of the northern and eastern coastal

areas of Sri Lanka but has conducted operations throughout

the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTE

leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive

network of checkpoints and informants to keep track

of any outsiders who enter the group’s area of control.

The LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatism

by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations.

The LTTE also uses its international contacts and the large

Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure

weapons, communications, funding, and other

needed supplies

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in the

early 1990s among Libyans who had fought against Soviet

forces in Afghanistan and against the Qadhafi regime

in Libya. The LIFG declared the Government of Libyan

leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow

it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi

focus and organize against Libyan Government interests,

but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin and believed

to be part of al-Qa’ida’s leadership structure or active in

the international terrorist network.

Libyans associated with the LIFG are part of the broader

international jihadist movement. The LIFG is one of the

groups believed to have planned the Casablanca suicide

bombings in May 2003. The LIFG claimed responsibility

for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996

and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during

the 1990s. It continues to target Libyan interests and

may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.

Not known, but probably has several hundred active members

or supporters.

Probably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, but

since the late 1990s many members have fled to various

Asian, Persian Gulf, African, and European countries, particularly

the United Kingdom.

Not known. May obtain some funding through private

donations, various Islamic non-governmental organizations,

and criminal acts.

a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran, The

People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI),

National Council of Resistance (NCR), The National

Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Muslim Iranian

Students’ Society

The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed

in the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iran

after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support

came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein

starting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-Western

attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Since then, it

has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the

clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK advocates

the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement

with the group’s own leadership.

The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government

stresses propaganda and occasionally uses

terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military

personnel and US civilians working on defense projects

in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US

Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs

in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the

Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials,

including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad

Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier

Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980-

1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military

equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces.

In 1991, the MEK assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing

the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq

and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the

MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies

and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating

the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas.

In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers

and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed

Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted

to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters,

Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating

policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations

increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in

February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks

against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack

against the leadership complex in Tehran that housed

the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000

and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks

and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforcement

units and Government buildings near the Iran-Iraq

border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward the

end of 2001. After Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases at

the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK leadership

ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces, and a

formal cease-fire arrangement was reached in May 2003.

Over 3,000 MEK members are currently confined to Camp

Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad,

where they remain under the Geneva Convention’s “protected

person” status and Coalition control. As a condition

of the cease-fire agreement, the group relinquished its

weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy

artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have

“defected” from the Ashraf group, and several dozen of

them have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.

In the 1980s, the MEK’s leaders were forced by Iranian

security forces to flee to France. On resettling in Iraq in

1987, almost all of its armed units were stationed in fortified

bases near the border with Iran. Since Operation

Iraqi Freedom, the bulk of the group is limited to Camp

Ashraf, although an overseas support structure remains

with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe

and North America.

Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group received all

of its military assistance, and most of its financial support,

from the former Iraqi regime. The MEK also has used

front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate

Iranian communities.

The ELN is a Colombian Marxist insurgent group formed

in 1965 by urban intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro

and Che Guevara. It is primarily rural-based, although it

possesses several urban units. In May 2004, Colombian

President Uribe proposed a renewal of peace talks, but

by the end of the year talks had not commenced.

Kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and extortion. Minimal

conventional military capability. Annually conducts

hundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign

employees of large corporations, especially in the

petroleum industry. Derives some revenue from taxation

of the illegal narcotics industry. Frequently assaults energy

infrastructure and has inflicted major damage on

pipelines and the electric distribution network.

Approximately 3,000 armed combatants and an unknown

number of active supporters.

Mostly in rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern,

and southwestern Colombia, and Venezuelan

border regions.

Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation.

Venezuela continues to provide a hospitable

environment.

a.k.a. PLF-Abu Abbas Faction

The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) broke away from

the PFLP-GC in the late 1970s and later split again into

pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-

PLO faction was led by Muhammad Abbas (a.k.a. Abu

Abbas) and was based in Baghdad prior to Operation

Iraqi Freedom.

Abbas’ group was responsible for the attack in 1985 on

the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of

US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Abu Abbas died of natural

causes in April 2004 while in US custody in Iraq. Current

leadership and membership of the relatively small

PLF appears to be based in Lebanon and the Palestinian

territories. The PLF has become more active since the

start of the al-Aqsa intifadah and several PLF members

have been arrested by Israeli authorities for planning attacks

in Israel and the West Bank.

Unknown.

Based in Iraq since 1990, has a presence in Lebanon and

the West Bank.

Received support mainly from Iraq; has received support

from Libya in the past.

a.k.a. Islamic Jihad of Palestine, PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction,

PIJ-Shalla Faction, Al-Quds Brigades

Formed by militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during

the 1970s, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is committed

to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction

of Israel through attacks against Israeli military

and civilian targets inside Israel and the Palestinian territories.

PIJ militants have conducted many attacks, including

large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and

military targets. The group maintained operational activity

in 2004, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli

interests. PIJ has not yet directly targeted US interests; it

continues to direct attacks against Israelis inside Israel

and the territories, although US citizens have died in attacks

mounted by the PIJ.

Unknown.

Primarily Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The

group’s primary leadership resides in Syria, though other

leadership elements reside in Lebanon, as well as other

parts of the Middle East.

Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistical

assistance from Syria.

Formerly a part of the PLO, the Marxist-Leninist PFLP was

founded by George Habash when it broke away from the

Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The PFLP does not

view the Palestinian struggle as religious, seeing it instead

as a broader revolution against Western imperialism. The

group earned a reputation for spectacular international

attacks, including airline hijackings, that have killed at

least 20 US citizens.

The PFLP committed numerous international terrorist attacks

during the 1970s. Since 1978, the group has

conducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets,

including killing a settler and her son in December

1996. The PFLP has stepped up its operational activity

since the start of the current intifadah, highlighted by at

least two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple joint

operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, and

assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minster in 2001 to avenge

Israel’s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year.

Unknown.

Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

Receives safe haven and some logistical assistance from

Syria.

The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it

wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics.

Originally it was violently opposed to the Arafat-led PLO.

The group is led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the

Syrian Army, whose son Jihad was killed by a car bomb

in May 2002. The PFLP-GC is closely tied to both Syria

and Iran.

Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle

East during the 1970s and 1980s. Known for cross-border

terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such

as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primary

focus is now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon

and small-scale attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the

Gaza Strip.

Several hundred.

Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.

Receives logistical and military support from Syria and

financial support from Iran.

a.k.a. Usama Bin Ladin Organization

Al-Qa’ida was established by Usama Bin Ladin in 1988

with Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet

Union. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni

Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Goal is to

unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means of

defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems “non-Islamic,”

and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from

Muslim countries. Eventual goal would be establishment

of a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world. Issued

statement in February 1998 under the banner of “The

World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders”

saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US

citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere.

Merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001,

renaming itself “Qa’idat al-Jihad.” Merged with Abu

Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq in late 2004,

with al-Zarqawi’s group changing its name to “Qa’idat

al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn” (al-Qa’ida in the Land of

the Two Rivers).

In 2004, the Saudi-based al-Qa’ida network and associated

extremists launched at least 11 attacks, killing over

60 people, including six Americans, and wounding more

than 225 in Saudi Arabia. Focused on targets associated

with US and Western presence and Saudi security forces

in Riyadh, Yanbu, Jeddah, and Dhahran. Attacks consisted

of vehicle bombs, infantry assaults, kidnappings,

targeted shootings, bombings, and beheadings. Other

al-Qa’ida networks have been involved in attacks in Afghanistan

and Iraq.

In 2003, carried out the assault and bombing on May 12

of three expatriate housing complexes in Riyadh, Saudi

Arabia, that killed 30 and injured 216. Backed attacks

on May 16 in Casablanca, Morocco, of a Jewish center,

restaurant, nightclub, and hotel that killed 33 and injured

101. Probably supported the bombing of the J.W. Marriott

Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, on August 5, that killed 12

and injured 149. Responsible for the assault and bombing

on November 9 of a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi

Arabia, that killed 17 and injured 122. The suicide bombers

and others associated with the bombings of two synagogues

in Istanbul, Turkey, on November 15 that killed

20 and injured 300 and the bombings in Istanbul of the

British Consulate and HSBC Bank on November 20 that

resulted in 41 dead and 555 injured had strong links to

al-Qa’ida. Conducted two assassination attempts against

Pakistani President Musharraf in December 2003. Was

involved in some attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 2002, carried out bombing on November 28 of a hotel

in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Probably

supported a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia,

on October 12 by Jemaah Islamiya that killed more than

200. Responsible for an attack on US military personnel

in Kuwait on October 8 that killed one US soldier and

injured another. Directed a suicide attack on the tanker

M/V Limburg off the coast of Yemen on October 6 that

killed one and injured four. Carried out a firebombing of

a synagogue in Tunisia on April 11 that killed 19 and injured

22. On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa’ida suicide

attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets

— two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one

into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into

a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania — leaving nearly

3,000 individuals dead or missing. Directed the attack

on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, on October 12,

2000, killing 17 US Navy sailors and injuring another 39.

Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies

in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,

that killed at least 301 individuals and injured more than

5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicopters

and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have

conducted three bombings that targeted US troops in

Aden, Yemen, in December 1992.

Al-Qa’ida is linked to the following plans that were disrupted

or not carried out: to bomb in mid-air a dozen US

trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to set off a bomb at Los

Angeles International Airport in 1999. Also plotted to

carry out terrorist operations against US and Israeli tourists

visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations in late 1999

(Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and

put 28 suspects on trial). In December 2001, suspected

al-Qa’ida associate Richard Colvin Reid attempted to ignite

a shoe bomb on a trans-Atlantic flight from Paris to

Miami. Attempted to shoot down an Israeli chartered

plane with a surface-to-air missile as it departed the

Mombasa, Kenya, airport in November 2002.

Al-Qa’ida’s organizational strength is difficult to determine

in the aftermath of extensive counterterrorist efforts

since 9/11. However, the group probably has several thousand

extremists and associates worldwide inspired by the

group’s ideology. The arrest and deaths of mid-level and

senior al-Qa’ida operatives have disrupted some communication,

financial, and facilitation nodes and interrupted

some terrorist plots. Al-Qa’ida also serves as a focal point

or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that

includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including

some members of Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement

of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.

Al-Qa’ida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its

ties to Sunni extremist networks. It was based in Afghanistan

until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power

in late 2001. Al-Qa’ida has dispersed in small groups

across South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and

Africa, and probably will attempt to carry out future attacks

against US interests.

Al-Qa’ida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits

donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly

siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.

US and international efforts to block al-Qa’ida

funding have hampered the group’s ability to obtain money.

a.k.a. 32-County Sovereignty Committee

RIRA was formed in the late 1990s as the clandestine

armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a

“political pressure group” dedicated to removing British

forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The

RIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace

process. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposed

Sinn Fein’s adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell

principles of democracy and non-violence; it also opposed

the amendment in December 1999 of Articles 2 and 3 of

the Irish Constitution, which had claimed the territory of

Northern Ireland. Despite internal rifts and calls by some

jailed members — including the group’s founder Michael

“Mickey” McKevitt — for a ceasefire and disbandment,

RIRA has pledged additional violence and continues to

conduct attacks.

Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Many Real IRA

members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army

members who left that organization after the Provisional

IRA renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members

brought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and

bomb making to RIRA. Targets have included civilians

(most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998),

British security forces, police in Northern Ireland, and

local Protestant communities. RIRA’s most recent fatal

attack was in August 2002 at a London army base that

killed a construction worker. In 2004, RIRA conducted

several postal bomb attacks and made threats against

prison officers, people involved in the new policing arrangements,

and senior politicians. RIRA also planted

incendiary devices in Belfast shopping areas and conducted

a serious shooting attack against a Police Service

of Northern Ireland station in September. The organization

reportedly wants to improve its intelligence-gathering

ability, engineering capacity, and access to weaponry; it

also trains members in the use of guns and explosives.

RIRA continues to attract new members, and its senior

members are committed to launching attacks on security

forces. Arrests in the spring led to the discovery of incendiary

and explosive devices at a RIRA bomb making

facility in Limerick. The group also engaged in smuggling

and other non-terrorist crime in Ireland.

The number of activists may have fallen to less than 100.

The organization may receive limited support from IRA

hardliners and Republican sympathizers dissatisfied with

the IRA’s continuing cease-fire and Sinn Fein’s involvement

in the peace process. Approximately 40 RIRA

members are in Irish jails.

Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and Irish Republic.

Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the

United States and of attempting to buy weapons from US

gun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchased

sophisticated weapons from the Balkans, and to have

taken materials from Provisional IRA arms dumps in the

later 1990s.

Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian

Communist Party, the FARC is Latin America’s oldest,

largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency of

Marxist origin. Although only nominally fighting in support

of Marxist goals today, the FARC is governed by a

general secretariat led by long-time leader Manuel

Marulanda (a.k.a. “Tirofijo”) and six others, including senior

military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. “Mono

Jojoy”). Organized along military lines but includes some

specialized urban fighting units. A Colombian military

offensive targeting FARC fighters in their former safe haven

in southern Colombia has experienced some success,

with several FARC mid-level leaders killed or captured.

On December 31, 2004, FARC leader Simon Trinidad,

the highest-ranking FARC leader ever captured, was extradited

to the United States on drug charges.

Bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion,

and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military

action against Colombian political, military, and

economic targets. In March 1999, the FARC executed

three US indigenous rights activists on Venezuelan territory

after it kidnapped them in Colombia. In February

2003, the FARC captured and continues to hold three US

contractors and killed one other American when their

plane crashed in Florencia. Foreign citizens often are

targets of FARC kidnapping for ransom. The FARC has

well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking

activities, including taxation, cultivation, and

distribution.

Approximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants and

several thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.

Primarily in Colombia with some activities — extortion,

kidnapping, weapons sourcing, logistics, and R&R — suspected

in neighboring Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Peru,

and Ecuador.

Cuba provides some medical care, safe haven, and political

consultation. In December 2004, a Colombian

Appeals Court declared three members of the Irish Republican

Army — arrested in Colombia in 2001 upon

exiting the former FARC-controlled demilitarized zone

(despeje) — guilty of providing advanced explosives training

to the FARC. The FARC often uses the Colombia/

Venezuela border area for cross-border incursions and

consider Venezuelan territory as a safe haven.

a.k.a. Revolutionary Cells, Revolutionary Popular

Struggle, ELA

Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad range

of antiestablishment and anti-US/NATO/EU leftist groups

active in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group is

believed to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece’s

most prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People’s

Struggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since January

1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left by

ELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene.

RN’s few communiqués show strong similarities in rhetoric,

tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has not

claimed an attack since November 2000, nor has it announced

its disbandment.

Since it began operations in January 1995, the group has

claimed responsibility for some two dozen arson attacks

and low-level bombings against a range of US, Greek,

and other European targets in Greece. In its most infamous

and lethal attack to date, the group claimed

responsibility for a bomb it detonated at the Intercontinental

Hotel in April 1999 that resulted in the death of a

Greek woman and injured a Greek man. Its modus operandi

includes warning calls of impending attacks, attacks

targeting property instead of individuals, use of rudimentary

timing devices, and strikes during the late-evening to

early-morning hours. RN may have been responsible for

two attacks in July 2003 against a US insurance company

and a local bank in Athens. RN’s last confirmed attacks

against US interests in Greece came in November 2000,

with two separate bombings against the Athens offices of

Citigroup and the studio of a Greek-American sculptor.

Greek targets have included judicial and other Government

office buildings, private vehicles, and the offices of

Greek firms involved in NATO-related defense contracts

in Greece. Similarly, the group has attacked European interests

in Athens. The group did not conduct an attack in

2004.

Group membership is believed to be small, probably

drawing from the Greek militant leftist or anarchist milieu.

Primary area of operation is in the Athens metropolitan

area.

Unknown but believed to be self-sustaining.

a.k.a. Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, Revolutionary Left

This group originally formed in Turkey in 1978 as Devrimci

Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary

Youth). Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting.

“Party” refers to the group’s political activities, while

“Front” is a reference to the group’s militant operations.

The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is

vehemently anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish establishment.

Its goals are the establishment of a socialist

state and the abolition of one- to three-man prison cells,

called F-type prisons. DHKP/C finances its activities

chiefly through donations and extortion.

Since the late 1980s the group has targeted primarily current

and retired Turkish security and military officials. It

began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990,

which included attacks against US military and diplomatic

personnel and facilities. To protest perceived US imperialism

during the Gulf War, Dev Sol assassinated two US

military contractors, wounded an Air Force officer, and

bombed more than 20 US and NATO military, commercial,

and cultural facilities. In its first significant terrorist

act as DHKP/C in 1996, the group assassinated a prominent

Turkish businessman and two others. DHKP/C added

suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with successful

attacks against Turkish police in January and September.

Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used improvised

explosive devices against official Turkish targets

and soft US targets of opportunity; attacks against US targets

beginning in 2003 probably came in response to

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operations and arrests against

the group have weakened its capabilities. DHKP/C did

not conduct any major terrorist attacks in 2003, but on

June 24, 2004 — just days before the NATO summit —

an explosive device detonated, apparently prematurely,

aboard a passenger bus in Istanbul while a DHKP/C operative

was transporting it to another location, killing the

operative and three other persons.

Probably several dozen terrorist operatives inside Turkey,

with a large support network throughout Europe. On April

1, 2004, authorities arrested more than 40 suspected

DHKP/C members in coordinated raids across Turkey and

Europe. In October, 10 alleged members of the group

were sentenced to life imprisonment, while charges were

dropped against 20 other defendants because of a statute

of limitations.

Turkey, primarily Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana.

Raises funds in Europe.

Widely believed to have training facilities or offices in

Lebanon and Syria.

a.k.a. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Le

Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), a splinter

group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), seeks to

overthrow the Algerian Government with the goal of installing

an Islamic regime. GSPC eclipsed the GIA in

approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective

and largest armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the

GIA, the GSPC pledged to avoid civilian attacks inside

Algeria.

The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at Algerian

Government and military targets, primarily in rural

areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. The Government

of Algeria scored major counterterrorism

successes against GSPC in 2004, significantly weakening

the organization, which also has been plagued with

internal divisions. Algerian military forces killed GSPC

leader Nabil Sahraoui and one of his top lieutenants, Abbi

Abdelaziz, in June 2004 in the mountainous area east of

Algiers. In October, the Algerian Government took custody

of Abderazak al-Para, who led a GSPC faction that

held 32 European tourists hostage in 2003. According to

press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe and the

Middle East maintain contact with other North African

extremists sympathetic to al-Qa’ida. In late 2003, the

GSPC leader issued a communiqué announcing the

group’s support of a number of jihadist causes and movements,

including al-Qa’ida.

Several hundred fighters with an unknown number of facilitators

outside Algeria.

Algeria, the Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania,

and northern Niger), Canada, and Western Europe.

Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many

residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistical

support. GSPC members also engage in criminal

activity.

a.k.a. Sendero Luminoso People’s Liberation Army

Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL

in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the

foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s,

SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the

Western Hemisphere. Approximately 30,000 persons

have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. The

Peruvian Government made dramatic gains against SL

during the 1990s, but reports of recent SL involvement in

narco-trafficking and kidnapping for ransom indicate it

may be developing new sources of support. Its stated

goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace

them with a communist peasant revolutionary

regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments.

Peruvian Courts in 2003 granted approximately

1,900 members the right to request retrials in a civilian

court, including the imprisoned top leadership. The trial

of Guzman, who was arrested in 1992, was scheduled

for November 5, 2004, but was postponed after the first

day, when chaos erupted in the courtroom.

Conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective

assassinations.

Unknown but estimated to be some 300 armed militants.

Peru, with most activity in rural areas.

Aid None.

a.k.a. Al-Zarqawi Network, Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Al-

Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of The Two

Rivers, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad

The Jordanian Palestinian Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (Ahmad

Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah, a.k.a. Abu Ahmad, Abu Azraq)

established cells in Iraq soon after the commencement of

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), formalizing his group in

April 2004 to bring together jihadists and other insurgents

in Iraq fighting against US and Coalition forces. Zarqawi

initially called his group “Unity and Jihad” (Jama‘at al-

Tawhid wa’al-Jihad, or JTJ). Zarqawi and his group helped

finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists

for the Iraqi resistance. The group adopted its current

name after its October 2004 merger with Usama Bin

Ladin’s al-Qa’ida. The immediate goal of QJBR is to expel

the Coalition — through a campaign of bombings,

kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation — and establish

an Islamic state in Iraq. QJBR’s longer-term goal

is to proliferate jihad from Iraq into “Greater Syria,” that

is, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.

In August 2003, Zarqawi’s group carried out a major international

terrorist attack in Iraq when it bombed the

Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, followed 12 days later

by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

(VBIED) attack against the UN Headquarters in Baghdad,

killing 23, including the Secretary-General’s Special Representative

for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Also in August

the group conducted a VBIED attack against Shi‘a worshippers

outside the Imam Ali Mosque in Al Najaf, killing

85 — including the leader of the Supreme Council for

the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). It kept up its attack

pace throughout 2003, striking numerous Iraqi, Coalition,

and relief agency targets such as the Red Cross. Zarqawi’s

group conducted VBIED attacks against US military personnel

and Iraqi infrastructure throughout 2004, including

suicide attacks inside the Green Zone perimeter in

Baghdad. The group successfully penetrated the Green

Zone in the October bombing of a popular café and market.

Zarqawi’s group fulfilled a pledge to target Shi‘a; its

March attacks on Shi‘a celebrating the religious holiday

of Ashura, killing over 180, was its most lethal attack to

date. The group also killed key Iraqi political figures in

2004, most notably the head of Iraq’s Governing Council.

The group has claimed responsibility for the

videotaped execution by beheading of Americans Nicholas

Berg (May 8, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 20,

2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004). The group

may have been involved in other hostage incidents as well.

Zarqawi’s group has been active in the Levant since its

involvement in the failed Millennium plot directed against

US, Western, and Jordanian targets in Jordan in late 1999.

The group assassinated USAID official Laurence Foley in

2002, but the Jordanian Government has successfully disrupted

further plots against US and Western interests in

Jordan, including a major arrest of Zarqawi associates in

2004 planning to attack Jordanian security targets.

QJBR’s numerical strength is unknown, though the group

has attracted new recruits to replace key leaders and other

members killed or captured by Coalition forces. Zarqawi’s

increased stature from his formal relationship with al-

Qa’ida could attract additional recruits to QJBR.

QJBR’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but the

group maintains an extensive logistical network throughout

the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

QJBR probably receives funds from donors in the Middle

East and Europe, local sympathizers in Iraq, and a variety

of businesses and criminal activities. In many cases,

QJBR’s donors are probably motivated by support for jihad

rather than affiliation with any specific terrorist group.

a.k.a. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

The AUC, commonly referred to as “the paramilitaries,”

is an umbrella organization formed in April 1997 to coordinate

the activities of local paramilitary groups and

develop a cohesive paramilitary effort to combat insurgents.

The AUC is supported by economic elites, drug

traffickers, and local communities lacking effective Government

security, and claims its primary objective is to

protect its sponsors from Marxist insurgents. The AUC’s

affiliate groups and other paramilitary units are in negotiations

with the Government of Colombia and in the midst

of the largest demobilization in modern Colombian history.

To date, approximately 3,600 AUC-affiliated fighters

have demobilized since November 2003.

AUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent

supporters to engaging guerrilla combat units. As

much as 70 percent of the AUC’s operational costs are

financed with drug-related earnings, with the rest coming

from “donations” from its sponsors. The AUC generally

avoids actions against US personnel or interests.

Estimated 8,000 to 11,000, with an unknown number of

active supporters.

AUC forces are strongest in the northwest of Colombia

in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, Atlantico, Magdelena,

Cesar, La Guajira, and Bolivar Departments, with affiliate

groups in the coffee region, Valle del Cauca, and

in Meta Department.

None.

The Al Badhr Mujahedin split from Hizbul-Mujahedin

(HM) in 1998. Traces its origins to 1971, when a group

named Al Badr attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. Later

operated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami

(HIG) in Afghanistan and, from 1990, as a unit of HM in

Kashmir. The group was relatively inactive until 2000.

Since then, it has increasingly claimed responsibility for

attacks against Indian military targets.

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian

military targets in Jammu and Kashmir.

Perhaps several hundred.

Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Aid Unknown.

Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)

Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)

Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)

Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)

Communist Party of India (Maoist)

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)

Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)

Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)

Islamic Great East Raiders–Front (IBDA-C)

Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)

Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)

Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)

New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)

Red Hand Defenders (RHD)

Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)

Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)

Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)

Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)

Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

Turkish Hizballah

Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

AIAI rose to prominence in the Horn of Africa in the early

1990s, following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime

and the subsequent collapse of the Somali nation state

into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive and suffered

divisions between factions supporting moderate

Islam and more puritanical Islamic ideology. Following

military defeats in 1996 and 1997, AIAI evolved into a

loose network of highly compartmentalized cells, factions,

and individuals with no central control or coordination.

AIAI elements pursue a variety of agendas ranging from

social services and education to insurgency activities in

the Ogaden. Some AIAI-associated sheikhs espouse a

radical fundamentalist version of Islam, with particular

emphasis on a strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law), a

view often at odds with Somali emphasis on clan identity.

A small number of AIAI-associated individuals have

provided logistical support to and maintain ties with al-

Qa’ida; however, the network’s central focus remains the

establishment of an Islamic government in Somalia.

Elements of AIAI may have been responsible for the kidnapping

and murder of relief workers in Somalia and

Somaliland in 2003 and 2004, and during the late 1990s.

Factions of AIAI may also have been responsible for a

series of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in

1996 and 1997. Most AIAI factions have recently concentrated

on broadening their religious base, renewed

emphasis on building businesses, and undertaking “hearts

and minds” actions, such as sponsoring orphanages and

schools and providing security that uses an Islamic legal

structure in the areas where it is active.

The actual membership strength is unknown.

Primarily in Somalia, with a presence in the Ogaden region

of Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti.

Receives funds from Middle East financiers and Somali

diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the

Arabian Peninsula.

The ABB, the breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist

Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army, was

formed in the mid-1980s. The ABB was added to the

Terrorist Exclusion list in December 2001.

Responsible for more than 100 murders, including the

murder in 1989 of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines.

In March 1997, the group announced it had

formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary

Proletarian Army (RPA). In March 2000, the

group claimed credit for a rifle grenade attack against the

Department of Energy building in Manila and strafed Shell

Oil offices in the central Philippines to protest rising oil

prices.

Approximately 500.

The largest RPA/ABB groups are on the Philippine islands

of Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas.

Unknown.

a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units

The NTA is a clandestine leftist extremist group that first

appeared in Italy’s Friuli region in 1995. Adopted the

class struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970s

and 1980s and a similar logo — an encircled five-point

star — for their declarations. Seeks the formation of an

“anti-imperialist fighting front” with other Italian leftist

terrorist groups, including Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative

Nuclei and the New Red Brigades. Opposes what

it perceives as US and NATO imperialism and condemns

Italy’s foreign and labor polices. In a leaflet dated January

2002, NTA identified experts in four Italian

Government sectors — federalism, privatizations, justice

reform, and jobs and pensions — as potential targets.

To date, NTA has conducted attacks only against property.

During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999,

NTA members threw gasoline bombs at the Venice and

Rome headquarters of the then-ruling party, Democrats

of the Left. NTA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack

in September 2000 against the Central European Initiative

office in Trieste and a bomb attack in August 2001

against the Venice Tribunal building. In January 2002,

police thwarted an attempt by four NTA members to enter

the Rivolto Military Air Base. In 2003, NTA claimed

responsibility for the arson attacks against three vehicles

belonging to US troops serving at the Ederle and Aviano

bases in Italy. There has been no reported activity by the

group since the arrest in January 2004 of NTA’s founder

and leader.

Accounts vary from one to approximately 20 members.

Primarily northeastern Italy and near US military installations

in northern Italy.

None evident.

a.k.a. Cholana Kangtoap Serei Cheat Kampouchea

The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November

1998 in the wake of political violence that saw

many influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cambodian

People’s Party assume power. With an avowed

aim of overthrowing the Government, the group is led by

a Cambodian-American, a former member of the opposition

Sam Rainsy Party. The CFF’s membership reportedly

includes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand and

the United States, and former soldiers from the Khmer

Rouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various political

factions.

The Cambodian Government arrested seven CFF members

who were reportedly planning an unspecified terrorist

attack in southwestern Cambodia in late 2003, but there

were no successful CFF attacks that year. Cambodian

courts in February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFF

members suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in

2000. The courts convicted 19 members, including one

US citizen, of “terrorism” and/or “membership in an

armed group” and sentenced them to terms of five years

to life imprisonment. The group claimed responsibility

for an attack in late November 2000 on several Government

installations that killed at least eight persons and

wounded more than a dozen. In April 1999, five CFF

members were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel depot

outside Phnom Penh with anti-tank weapons.

Exact strength is unknown, but totals probably never have

exceeded 100 armed fighters.

Northeastern Cambodia near the Thai border, and the

United States.

US-based leadership collects funds from the Cambodian-

American community.

Formerly Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI)

and People’s War (PW)

The Indian groups known as the Maoist Communist Center

of India and People’s War (a.k.a. People’s War Group)

joined together in September 2004 to form the Communist

Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist). The MCCI

was originally formed in the early 1970s, while People’s

War was founded in 1975. Both groups are referred to as

Naxalites, after the West Bengal village where a revolutionary

radical Left movement originated in 1967. The

new organization continues to employ violence to achieve

its goals — peasant revolution, abolition of class hierarchies,

and expansion of Maoist-controlled “liberated

zones,” eventually leading to the creation of an independent

“Maoist” state. The CPI (Maoist) reportedly has a

significant cadre of women. Important leaders include

Ganapati (the PW leader from Andhra Pradesh), Pramod

Mishra, Uma Shankar, and P.N.G. (alias Nathuni Mistry,

arrested by Jharkhand police in 2002).

Prior to its consolidation with the PW, the MCCI ran a

virtual parallel government in remote areas, where it collected

a “tax” from the villagers and, in turn, provided

infrastructure improvements such as building hospitals,

schools, and irrigation projects. It ran a parallel court system

wherein allegedly corrupt block development officials

and landlords — frequent MCCI targets — had been punished

by amputation and even death. People’s War

conducted a low-intensity insurgency that included attempted

political assassination, theft of weapons from

police stations, kidnapping police officers, assaulting civilians,

extorting money from construction firms, and

vandalizing the property of multinational corporations.

Together the two groups were reportedly responsible for

the deaths of up to 170 civilians and police a year.

Although difficult to assess with any accuracy, media reports

and local authorities suggest the CPI (Maoist)’s

membership may be as high as 31,000, including both

hard-core militants and dedicated sympathizers.

The CPI (Maoist), believed to be enlarging the scope of its

influence, operates in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh,

Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and parts of West

Bengal. It also has a presence on the Bihar-Nepal border.

The CPI (Maoist) has loose links to other Maoist groups in

the region, including the Communist Party of Nepal

(Maoists). The MCCI was a founding member of the Coordination

Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations

of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) insurgency grew

out of the radicalization and fragmentation of left-wing

parties following Nepal’s transition to democracy in 1990.

The United People’s Front — a coalition of left-wing parties

— participated in the elections of 1991, but the Maoist

wing failed to win the required minimum number of votes,

leading to its exclusion from voter lists in the elections of

1994 and prompting the group to launch the insurgency

in 1996. The CPN/M’s ultimate objective is the overthrow

of the Nepalese Government and the establishment of a

Maoist state. In 2003, the United States designated Nepal’s

Maoists under Executive Order (EO) 13224 as a supporter

of terrorist activity.

The Maoists have utilized traditional guerrilla warfare tactics

and engage in murder, torture, arson, sabotage,

extortion, child conscription, kidnapping, bombings, and

assassinations to intimidate and coerce the populace. In

2002, Maoists claimed responsibility for assassinating two

Nepalese US Embassy guards, citing anti-Maoist spying,

and in a press statement threatened foreign embassies,

including the US mission, to deter foreign support for the

Nepalese Government. Maoists are suspected in the September

2004 bombing at the American Cultural Center

in Kathmandu. The attack, which caused no injuries and

only minor damage, marked the first time the Maoists

had damaged US Government property.

Probably several thousand full-time cadres.

Operations are conducted throughout Nepal. Press reports

indicate some Maoist leaders reside in India.

None.

a.k.a. Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), Ex-

FAR/Interahamwe

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

(FDLR) in 2001 supplanted the Army for the Liberation of

Rwanda (ALIR), which is the armed branch of the PALIR,

or the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda. ALIR was formed

from the merger of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR),

the army of the ethnic Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime

that orchestrated the genocide of 500,000 or more Tutsis

and regime opponents in 1994, and Interahamwe, the

civilian militia force that carried out much of the killing,

after the two groups were forced from Rwanda into the

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC- then Zaire) that

year. Though directly descended from those who organized

and carried out the genocide, identified FDLR

leaders are not thought to have played a role in the killing.

They have worked to build bridges to other opponents

of the Kigali regime, including ethnic Tutsis.

ALIR sought to topple Rwanda’s Tutsi-dominated Government,

reinstitute Hutu domination, and, possibly,

complete the genocide. In 1996, a message — allegedly

from the ALIR — threatened to kill the US ambassador to

Rwanda and other US citizens. In 1999, ALIR guerrillas

critical of US-UK support for the Rwandan regime kidnapped

and killed eight foreign tourists, including two

US citizens, in a game park on the Democratic Republic

of Congo-Uganda border. Three suspects in the attack

are in US custody awaiting trial. In the 1998-2002 Congolese

war, the ALIR/FDLR was allied with Kinshasa

against the Rwandan invaders. FDLR’s political wing

mainly has sought to topple the Kigali regime via an alliance

with Tutsi regime opponents. It established the

ADRN Igihango alliance in 2002, but it has not resonated

politically in Rwanda.

Exact strength is unknown, but several thousand FDLR

guerrillas operate in the eastern DRC close to the Rwandan

border. In 2003, the United Nations, with Rwandan assistance,

repatriated close to 1,500 FDLR combatants from

the DRC. The senior FDLR military commander returned

to Rwanda in November 2003 and has been working with

Kigali to encourage the return of his comrades.

Mostly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

provided training, arms, and supplies to ALIR forces to

combat Rwandan armed forces that invaded the DRC in

1998. Kinshasa halted that support in 2002, though allegations

persist of continued support from several local

Congolese warlords and militias (including the Mai Mai).

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a small

Islamic extremist group based in China’s western Xinjiang

Province. It is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist

groups pursuing an independent “Eastern Turkistan,”

an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China. ETIM is

linked to al-Qa’ida and the international mujahedin movement.

In September 2002 the group was designated under

EO 13224 as a supporter of terrorist activity.

ETIM militants fought alongside al-Qa’ida and Taliban

forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.

In October 2003, Pakistani soldiers killed ETIM leader

Hassan Makhsum during raids on al-Qa’ida–associated

compounds in western Pakistan. US and Chinese Government

information suggests ETIM is responsible for

various terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May

2002, two ETIM members were deported to China from

Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the US Embassy in

Kyrgyzstan as well as other US interests abroad.

Unknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs supports

the Xinjiang independence movement or the

formation of an Eastern Turkistan.

Xinjiang Province and neighboring countries in the region.

ETIM has received training and financial assistance from

al-Qa’ida.

GRAPO was formed in 1975 as the armed wing of the

illegal Communist Party of Spain during the Franco era.

Advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and

its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist regime. GRAPO

is vehemently anti-American, seeks the removal of all US

military forces from Spanish territory, and has conducted

and attempted several attacks against US targets since

1977. The group issued a communiqué following the

September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, expressing

its satisfaction that “symbols of imperialist power” were

decimated and affirming that “the war” has only just begun.

Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.

GRAPO did not mount a successful terrorist operation in

2004, marking the third consecutive year without an attack.

The group suffered more setbacks in 2004, with

several members and sympathizers arrested and sentences

upheld or handed down in April in the appellate case for

GRAPO militants arrested in Paris in 2000. GRAPO has

killed more than 90 persons and injured more than 200

since its formation. The group’s operations traditionally

have been designed to cause material damage and gain

publicity rather than inflict casualties, but the terrorists have

conducted lethal bombings and close-range assassinations.

Fewer than two dozen activists remain. Police have made

periodic large-scale arrests of GRAPO members, crippling

the organization and forcing it into lengthy rebuilding

periods. In 2002, Spanish and French authorities arrested

22 suspected members, including some of the group’s

reconstituted leadership. More members were arrested

throughout 2003 and 2004.

Spain.

None.

HUJI, a Sunni extremist group that follows the Deobandi

tradition of Islam, was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to

fight in the jihad against the Soviets. It also is affiliated

with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction

(JUI-F) of the extremist religious party Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam

(JUI). The group, led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar and

chief commander Amin Rabbani, is made up primarily of

Pakistanis and foreign Islamists who are fighting for the

liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan.

The group has links to al-Qa’ida. At present, Akhtar

remains in detention in Pakistan after his August 2004

arrest and extradition from Dubai.

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian

military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. Linked to the

Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western

tourists in Jammu and Kashmir in July 1995; one was

killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were

killed in December of the same year.

Exact numbers are unknown, but there may be several

hundred members in Kashmir.

Pakistan and Kashmir. Trained members in Afghanistan

until autumn of 2001.

Specific sources of external aid are unknown.

The mission of HUJI-B, led by Shauqat Osman, is to establish

Islamic rule in Bangladesh. HUJI-B has

connections to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-

Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM),

which advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Jammu

and Kashmir. These groups all maintain contacts with

the al-Qa’ida network in Afghanistan. The leaders of HUJIB

and HUM both signed the February 1998 fatwa

sponsored by Usama bin Ladin that declared American

civilians to be legitimate targets for attack.

HUJI-B was accused of stabbing a senior Bangladeshi journalist

in November 2000 for making a documentary on

the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HUJI-B was suspected

in the assassination attempt in July 2000 of Bangladeshi

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The group may also have

been responsible for indiscriminate attacks using improvised

explosive devices against cultural gatherings in

Dhaka in January and April 2001.

Unknown; some estimates of HUJI-B cadre strength suggest

several thousand members.

The group operates and trains members in Bangladesh,

where it maintains at least six camps.

Funding of the HUJI-B comes primarily from madrassas

in Bangladesh. The group also has ties to militants in

Pakistan that may provide another funding source.

Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin

(HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and

it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war

against the Soviets. HIG has long-established links with

Usama Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several

terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a

pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic

conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the

latter fled Sudan in 1996. In a late 2004 press release,

Hikmatyar reiterated his commitment to fight US and

Coalition forces.

HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force US

troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan

Transitional Administration, and establish an Islamic

fundamentalist state. In 2004, several US soldiers were

killed in attacks in Konar, Afghanistan, the area in which

HIG is most active.

Unknown, but possibly could have hundreds of veteran

fighters on which to call.

Eastern Afghanistan (particularly Konar and Nurestan Provinces)

and adjacent areas of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Unknown.

Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM), the largest Kashmiri militant

group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the

liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan,

although some cadres favor independence. The

group is the militant wing of Pakistan’s largest Islamic political

party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and targets Indian security

forces,politicians and civilians in Jammu and Kashmir. It

reportedly operated in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s and

trained with the Afghan Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. The group, led

by Syed Salahuddin, is comprised primarily of ethnic

Kashmiris.

HM has conducted a number of operations against Indian

military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The group

also occasionally strikes at civilian targets, but has not

engaged in terrorist acts outside India. HM claimed responsibility

for numerous attacks within Kashmir in 2004.

Exact numbers are unknown, but estimates range from

several hundred to possibly as many as 1,000 members

in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.

Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.

Specific sources of external aid are unknown.

The INLA is a terrorist group formed in 1975 as the military

wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP),

which split from the Official IRA (OIRA) because of OIRA’s

cease-fire in 1972. The group’s primary aim is to end

British rule in Northern Ireland, force British troops out

of the province, and unite Ireland’s 32 counties into a

Marxist-Leninist revolutionary state. Responsible for some

of the most notorious killings of “The Troubles,” including

the bombing of a Ballykelly pub that killed 17 people

in 1982. Bloody internal feuding has repeatedly torn the

INLA. The INLA announced a cease-fire in August 1998

but continues to carry out occasional attacks and punishment

beatings.

The INLA has been active in Belfast and the border areas

of Northern Ireland, where it has conducted bombings,

assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and

robberies. It is also involved in drug trafficking. On occasion,

it has provided advance warning to police of its

attacks. Targets include the British military, Northern Ireland

security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. The

INLA continues to observe a cease-fire, because — in the

words of its leadership in 2003 — a return to armed

struggle is “not a viable option at this time.” However,

members of the group were accused of involvement in a

robbery and kidnapping in December 2004, which the

group denies.

Unclear, but probably fewer than 50 hard-core activists.

Police counterterrorist operations and internal feuding

have reduced the group’s strength and capabilities.

Northern Ireland, Irish Republic. Does not have a significant

established presence on the UK mainland.

Suspected in the past of receiving funds and arms from

sympathizers in the United States.

a.k.a. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA),

the Provos

Formed in 1969 as the clandestine armed wing of the

political movement Sinn Fein, the IRA is devoted both to

removing British forces from Northern Ireland and to unifying

Ireland. The IRA conducted attacks until its cease-fire

in 1997 and agreed to disarm as a part of the 1998 Belfast

Agreement, which established the basis for peace in

Northern Ireland. Dissension within the IRA over support

for the Northern Ireland peace process resulted in

the formation of two more radical splinter groups: Continuity

IRA (CIRA), and the Real IRA (RIRA) in mid to late

1990s. The IRA, sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distinguish

it from RIRA and CIRA, is organized into small,

tightly-knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council.

Traditional IRA activities have included bombings, assassinations,

kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion,

smuggling, and robberies. Before the cease-fire in 1997,

the group had conducted bombing campaigns on various

targets in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, including

senior British Government officials, civilians, police, and

British military targets. The group’s refusal in late 2004 to

allow photographic documentation of its decommissioning

process was an obstacle to progress in implementing

the Belfast Agreement and stalled talks. The group previously

had disposed of light, medium, and heavy weapons,

ammunition, and explosives in three rounds of decommissioning.

However, the IRA is believed to retain the

ability to conduct paramilitary operations. The group’s

extensive criminal activities reportedly provide the IRA

and the political party Sinn Fein with millions of dollars

each year; the IRA was implicated in two significant robberies

in 2004, one involving almost $50 million.

Several hundred members and several thousand sympathizers

despite the defection of some members to RIRA

and CIRA.

Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Europe.

In the past, the IRA has received aid from a variety of

groups and countries and considerable training and arms

from Libya and the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds,

arms, and other terrorist-related materiel from sympathizers

in the United States. Similarities in operations suggest

links to ETA and the FARC. In August 2002, three suspected

IRA members were arrested in Colombia on charges

of helping the FARC improve its explosives capabilities.

a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)

The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid-

1998 when the group released a series of communiqués

that expressed support for Usama Bin Ladin, appealed

for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government, and called

for operations against US and other Western interests in

Yemen. IAA was first designated under EO 13224 in September

2001.

IAA has engaged in small-scale operations such as bombings,

kidnappings, and small arms attacks to promote its

goals. The group reportedly was behind an attack in June

2003 against a medical assistance convoy in the Abyan

Governorate. Yemeni authorities responded with a raid

on a suspected IAA facility, killing several individuals and

capturing others, including Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi, the

group’s leader. Before that attack, the group had not conducted

operations since the bombing of the British

Embassy in Sanaa in October 2000. In 2001, Yemeni

authorities found an IAA member and three associates

responsible for that attack. In December 1998, the group

kidnapped 16 British, American, and Australian tourists

near Mudiyah in southern Yemen. Although Yemeni officials

previously have claimed that the group is

operationally defunct, their recent attribution of the attack

in 2003 against the medical convoy and reports that

al-Yazidi was released from prison in mid-October 2003

suggest that the IAA, or at least elements of the group,

have resumed activity. Speculation after the attack on

the USS Cole pointed to the involvement of the IAA, and

the group later claimed responsibility for the attack. The

IAA has been affiliated with al-Qa’ida. IAA members are

known to have trained and served in Afghanistan under

the leadership of seasoned mujahedin.

Not known.

Operates in the southern governorates of Yemen — primarily

Aden and Abyan.

Not known.

The Islamic Great East Raiders–Front (IBDA-C) is a Sunni

Salafist group that supports Islamic rule in Turkey and believes

that Turkey’s present secular leadership is “illegal.”

It has been known to cooperate with various opposition

elements in Turkey in attempts to destabilize the country’s

political structure. The group supports the establishment

of a “pure Islamic” state, to replace the present “corrupt”

Turkish regime that is cooperating with the West. Its primary

goal is the establishment of a “Federative Islamic

State,” a goal backed by armed terrorist attacks primarily

against civilian targets. It has been active since the mid-

1970s.

IBDA-C has engaged in activities such as bombings, throwing

Molotov cocktails, and sabotage. The group has

announced its actions and targets in publications to its

members, who are free to launch independent attacks.

IBDA-C typically has attacked civilian targets, including

churches, charities, minority-affiliated targets, television

transmitters, newspapers, pro-secular journalists, Ataturk

statues, taverns, banks, clubs, and tobacco shops. In May

2004, Turkish police indicted seven members of the group

for the assassination of retired Colonel Ihsan Guven, the

alleged leader of the “Dost” (Friend) sect, and his wife.

One of IBDA-C’s more renowned attacks was the killing

of 37 people in a firebomb attack in July 1993 on a hotel

in Sivas. Turkish police believe that IBDA-C has also

claimed responsibility for attacks carried out by other

groups to elevate its image.

Unknown.

Turkey.

Not known.

The IIPB is a terrorist group affiliated with the Chechen

separatist movement demanding a single Islamic state in

the North Caucasus. Chechen extremist leader Shamil

Basayev established the IIPB — consisting of Chechens,

Arabs, and other foreign fighters — in 1998, which he

led with Saudi-born mujahedin leader Ibn al-Khattab until

the latter’s death in March 2002. The IIPB was one of three

groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that seized

Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater and took more than 700 hostages

in October 2002. While this group has not been

identified as conducting attacks since their designation

two years ago, those Arab mujahedin still operating in

Chechnya now fall under the command of Abu Hafs

al-Urduni, who assumed the leadership in April 2004

after the death of Khattab’s successor, Abu al-Walid.

Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.

Involved in terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian

forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Chechen

non-combatants.

Up to 400 fighters, including as many as 100 Arabs and

other foreign fighters.

Primarily in Russia and adjacent areas of the north

Caucasus, particularly in the mountainous south of

Chechnya, with major logistical activities in Georgia,

Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

The IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be a primary conduit

for Islamic funding of the Chechen guerrillas, in part

through links to al-Qa’ida-related financiers on the Arabian

Peninsula.

The Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), probably founded by former

members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, made

its first appearance in early April 2004 when it claimed

responsibility for a string of events — including shootouts

and terrorist attacks — in Uzbekistan in late March and

early April that killed approximately 47 people, including

33 terrorists. The claim of responsibility, which was

posted to multiple militant Islamic websites, raged against

the leadership of Uzbekistan. In late July 2004, the group

struck again with near-simultaneous suicide bombings of

the US and Israeli Embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor

General’s office in Tashkent. The IJG again claimed responsibility

via an Islamic website and stated that

martyrdom operations by the group would continue. The

statement also indicated the attacks were done in support

of their Palestinian, Iraqi, and Afghan brothers in the

global jihad.

The IJG claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in 2004

against Uzbekistani, American, and Israeli entities. The

attackers in the March and April 2004 attacks, some of

whom were female suicide bombers, targeted the local

government offices of the Uzbekistani and Bukhara police,

killing approximately 47 people, including 33

terrorists. These attacks marked the first use of female

suicide bombers in Central Asia. On July 30, 2004, the

group launched a set of same-day attacks against the US

and Israeli Embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s

office. These attacks left four Uzbekistanis and three suicide

operatives dead. The date of the latter attack

corresponds to the start of a trial for individuals arrested

for their participation in earlier attacks.

Unknown.

Militants are scattered throughout Central Asia and probably

parts of South Asia.

Unknown.

The JUM is a small, pro-Pakistan militant group formed in

Jammu and Kashmir in 1990. Followers are mostly

Kashmiris, but the group includes some Pakistanis.

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian

military and political targets in Jammu and Kashmir, including

two grenade attacks against political targets in

2004.

Unknown.

Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.

Unknown.

a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)

The JRA is an international terrorist group formed around

1970 after breaking away from the Japanese Communist

League–Red Army Faction. The JRA’s historical goal has

been to overthrow the Japanese Government and monarchy

and to help foment world revolution. JRA’s leader,

Fusako Shigenobu, claimed that the forefront of the battle

against international imperialism was in Palestine, so in

the early 1970s she led her small group to the Middle

East to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel and

the West. After her arrest in November 2000, Shigenobu

announced she intended to pursue her goals using a legitimate

political party rather than revolutionary violence,

and the group announced it would disband in April 2001.

During the 1970s, JRA carried out a series of attacks

around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod

Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an

attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

During the late 1980s, JRA began to single out American

targets and used car bombs and rockets in attempted attacks

on US Embassies in Jakarta, Rome, and Madrid. In

April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with

explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning

an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO

club in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five,

including a US servicewoman. He was convicted of the

charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the

United States. Tsutomu Shirosaki, captured in 1996, is

also jailed in the United States. In 2000, Lebanon deported

to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but

granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum.

Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in

November 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and passport

fraud. Four JRA members remain in North Korea

following their involvement in a hijacking in 1970; five

of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

About six hard-core members; undetermined number of

sympathizers. At its peak, the group claimed to have 30

to 40 members.

Location unknown, but possibly in Asia and/or Syriancontrolled

areas of Lebanon.

Unknown.

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) favors the overthrow

of the Malaysian Government and the creation of

an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and the

southern Philippines. Malaysian authorities believe an

extremist wing of the KMM has engaged in terrorist acts

and has close ties to the regional terrorist organization

Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Key JI leaders, including the group’s

spiritual head, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and JI operational

leader Hambali, reportedly had great influence over KMM

members. The Government of Singapore asserts that a

Singaporean JI member assisted the KMM in buying a

boat to support jihad activities in Indonesia.

Malaysia is holding a number of KMM members under

the Internal Security Act (ISA) for activities deemed threatening

to Malaysia’s national security, including planning

to wage jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings and

robberies, the murder of a former state assemblyman, and

planning attacks on foreigners, including US citizens. A

number of those detained are also believed to be members

of Jemaah Islamiya. Several of the arrested KMM

militants have reportedly undergone military training in

Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahedin

during the war against the former Soviet Union. Some

members are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations

in Indonesia and the Philippines. In

September 2003, alleged KMM leader Nik Adli Nik Abdul

Aziz’s detention was extended for another two years. In

March 2004, Aziz and other suspected KMM members

went on a hunger strike as part of an unsuccessful bid for

freedom, but the Malaysian court rejected their applications

for a writ of habeas corpus in September. One alleged

KMM member was sentenced to 10 years in prison for

unlawful possession of firearms, explosives, and ammunition,

but eight other alleged members in detention since

2001 were released in July and in November. The Malaysian

Government is confident that the arrests of KMM

leaders have crippled the organization and rendered it

incapable of engaging in militant activities. Malaysian

officials in May 2004 denied Thailand’s charge that the

KMM was involved in the Muslim separatist movement

in southern Thailand.

KMM’s current membership is unknown.

The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian

states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and

Kelantan. They also operate in Kuala Lumpur. According

to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian

Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia,

to fight against Christians and to the southern

Philippines for operational training.

Largely unknown, probably self-financing.

The LRA was formally established in 1994, succeeding

the ethnic Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement and

other insurgent groups. LRA leader Joseph Kony has called

for the overthrow of the Ugandan Government and its

replacement with a regime run on the basis of the Ten

Commandments. More frequently, however, he has spoken

of the liberation and honor of the Acholi people,

whom he sees as oppressed by the “foreign” Government

of Ugandan President Museveni. Kony is the LRA’s undisputed

leader. He claims to have supernatural powers

and to receive messages from spirits, which he uses to

formulate the LRA’s strategy.

The Acholi people, whom Kony claims to be fighting to

liberate, are the ones who suffer most from his actions.

Since the early 1990’s, the LRA has kidnapped some

20,000 Ugandan children, mostly ethnic Acholi, to replenish

its ranks. Kony despises Acholi elders for having

given up the fight against Museveni and relies on abducted

children who can be brutally indoctrinated to fight for

the LRA. The LRA forces kidnapped children and adult

civilians to become soldiers, porters, and “wives” for LRA

leaders. The LRA prefers to attack camps for internally

displaced persons and other civilian targets, avoiding direct

engagement with the Ugandan military. Victims of

LRA attacks sometimes have their hands, fingers, ears,

noses, or other extremities cut off. The LRA stepped up

its activities from 2002 to 2004 after the Ugandan army,

with the Sudanese Government’s permission, attacked LRA

positions inside Sudan. By late 2003, the number of internally

displaced had doubled to 1.4 million, and the

LRA had pushed deep into non-Acholi areas where it had

never previously operated. During 2004, a combination

of military pressure, offers of amnesty, and several rounds

of negotiation markedly degraded LRA capabilities due to

death, desertion, and defection of senior commanders.

Estimated in early 2004 at between 500 and 1,000 fighters,

85 percent of whom are abducted children and

civilians, but numbers have since declined significantly.

Northern Uganda and southern Sudan.

Although the LRA has been supported by the Government

of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese now appear to

be cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a campaign

to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.

An extreme Loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of

the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the LVF did not emerge

publicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF hardliners

who have sought to prevent a political settlement with

Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic

politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who

endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occasionally

uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover name

for its actions but has also called for the group’s disbandment.

In October 2001, the British Government ruled

that the LVF had broken the cease-fire it declared in 1998

after linking the group to the murder of a journalist. According

to the Independent International Commission on

Decommissioning, the LVF decommissioned a small

amount of weapons in December 1998, but it has not

repeated this gesture. Designated under EO 13224 in

December 2001.

Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting attacks.

Finances its activities with drug money and other

criminal activities. LVF attacks have been particularly

vicious; the group has murdered numerous Catholic civilians

with no political or paramilitary affiliations,

including an 18-year-old Catholic girl in July 1997 because

she had a Protestant boyfriend. The terrorists also

have conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in

Irish border towns. From 2000 to 2004, the LVF has been

engaged in a violent feud with other Loyalists, which has

left several men dead.

Small, perhaps dozens of active members.

Northern Ireland and Ireland.

None.

The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group

(GICM) include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco

and supporting al-Qa’ida’s jihad against the West. The

group appears to have emerged in the 1990s and is comprised

of Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps

in Afghanistan and some who fought in the Afghan resistance

against Soviet occupation. GICM members interact

with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe.

On November 22, 2002, the United States

designated the GICM for asset freeze under EO 13224

following the group’s submission to the UNSCR 1267

Sanctions Committee.

Moroccans associated with the GICM are part of the

broader international jihadist movement. GICM is one

of the groups believed to be involved in planning the May

2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, and has been involved

in other plots. Members work with other North

African extremists, engage in trafficking falsified documents,

and possibly arms smuggling. The group in the

past has issued communiqués and statements against the

Moroccan Government. In the last year, a number of

arrests in Belgium, France, and Spain have disrupted the

group’s ability to operate, though cells and key members

still remain throughout Europe. Although the Abu Hafs

al-Masri Brigades, among others, claimed responsibility

on behalf of al-Qa’ida, Spanish authorities are investigating

the possibility that GICM was involved in the March

11, 2004, Madrid train bombings.

Unknown.

Morocco, Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Canada.

Unknown, but believed to include criminal activity

abroad.

a.k.a. Brigate Rosse/Partito Comunista Combattente

This Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Brigades,

active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to

ideology, both groups share the same symbol, a fivepointed

star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy’s

foreign and labor policies and to NATO.

In 2004, the BR/PCC continued to suffer setbacks, with

their leadership in prison and other members under pressure

from the Italian Government. The BR/PCC did not

claim responsibility for a blast at an employment agency

in Milan in late October, although the police suspect remnants

of the group are responsible. In 2003, Italian

authorities captured at least seven members of the BR/

PCC, dealing the terrorist group a severe blow to its operational

effectiveness. Some of those arrested are

suspects in the assassination in 1999 of Labor Ministry

adviser Massimo D’Antona, and authorities are hoping

to link them to the assassination in 2002 of Labor Ministry

advisor Marco Biagi. The arrests in October came on

the heels of a clash in March 2003 involving Italian Railway

Police and two BR/PCC members, which resulted in

the deaths of one of the operatives and an Italian security

officer. The BR/PCC has financed its activities through

armed robberies.

Fewer than 20.

Italy.

Unknown.

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and its

ally Qibla (an Islamic fundamentalist group that favors

political Islam and takes an anti-US and anti-Israel stance)

view the South African Government as a threat to Islamic

values. The two groups work to promote a greater political

voice for South African Muslims. PAGAD has used

front names such as Muslims Against Global Oppression

and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders when launching

anti-Western protests and campaigns.

PAGAD formed in November 1995 as a vigilante group

in reaction to crime in some neighborhoods of Cape Town.

In September 1996, a change in the group’s leadership

resulted in a change in the group’s goal, and it began to

support a violent jihad to establish an Islamic state. Between

1996 and 2000, PAGAD conducted a total of 189

bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the Western

Cape that caused serious injuries. PAGAD’s targets included

South African authorities, moderate Muslims,

synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and Western-

associated restaurants. PAGAD is believed to have

masterminded the bombing on August 25, 1998, of the

Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Since 2001, PAGAD’s violent

activities have been severely curtailed by law

enforcement and prosecutorial efforts against leading

members of the organization. Qibla leadership has organized

demonstrations against visiting US dignitaries and

other protests, but the extent of PAGAD’s involvement is

uncertain.

Early estimates were several hundred members. Current

operational strength is unknown, but probably vastly diminished.

Operates mainly in the Cape Town area.

May have ties to international Islamic extremists.

The RHD is an extremist terrorist group formed in 1998

and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from Loyalist

groups observing a cease-fire. RHD seeks to prevent

a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking

Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January

2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schools

in Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimate

targets. Despite calls in February 2002 by the Ulster Defense

Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF),

and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its disbandment,

RHD continued to make threats and issue

claims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often used

by elements of the banned UDA and LVF. Designated

under EO 13224 in December 2001.

In early 2003, the RHD claimed responsibility for killing

two UDA members as a result of what is described as

Loyalist internecine warfare. It also claimed responsibility

for a bomb that was left in the offices of Republican

Sinn Fein in West Belfast, although the device was defused

and no one was injured. In recent years, the group

has carried out numerous pipe bombings and arson attacks

against “soft” civilian targets such as homes,

churches, and private businesses. In January 2002, the

group bombed the home of a prison official in North

Belfast. Twice in 2002 the group claimed responsibility

for attacks — the murder of a Catholic postman and a

Catholic teenager — that were later claimed by the UDAUFF,

further blurring distinctions between the groups. In

2001, RHD claimed responsibility for killing five persons.

The RHD has claimed responsibility for hoax bomb devices,

and recently has set off petrol bombs and made

death threats against local politicians.

Up to 20 members, some of whom have experience in

terrorist tactics and bomb making. Police arrested one

member in June 2001 for making a hoax bomb threat.

Northern Ireland.

None.

The NIPR is a clandestine leftist extremist group that appeared

in Rome in 2000. Adopted the logo of the Red

Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s — an encircled five point

star — for its declarations. Opposes Italy’s foreign and

labor policies. Has targeted property interests rather than

personnel in its attacks.

The NIPR has not claimed responsibility for any attacks

since an April 2001 bomb attack on a building housing a

US-Italian relations association and an international affairs

institute in Rome’s historic center. The NIPR claimed

to have carried out a bombing in May 2000 in Rome at

an oversight committee facility for implementation of the

law on strikes in public services. The group also claimed

responsibility for an explosion in February 2002 on Via

Palermo adjacent to the Interior Ministry in Rome.

Possibly 12 members.

Mainly in Rome, Milan, Lazio, and Tuscany.

None evident.

RS is a radical leftist group that is anti-Greek establishment

and ideologically aligns itself with the organization

17 November. Although the group is not specifically anti-

US, its anti-imperialist rhetoric suggests it may become so.

First became known when the group conducted a bombing

in September 2003 against the courthouse at which

the trials of alleged 17 November members were ongoing.

In May 2004, the group detonated four improvised

explosive devices at a police station in Athens. These two

attacks were notable for their apparent attempts to target

and kill first responders — the first time a Greek terrorist

group had used this tactic. RS is widely regarded as the

most dangerous indigenous Greek terrorist group at this time.

Likely less than 50 members.

Athens, Greece.

Unknown.

Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion

of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM), led by Chechen extremist

leader Shamil Basayev, uses terrorism as part of an

effort to secure an independent Muslim state in the North

Caucasus. Basayev claimed the group was responsible

for the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 1-3,

2004, which culminated in the deaths of about 330

people; simultaneous suicide bombings aboard two Russian

civilian airliners in late August 2004; and a third

suicide bombing outside a Moscow subway that same

month. The RSRSBCM, whose name translates into English

as “Requirements for Getting into Paradise,” was not

known to Western observers before October 2002, when

it participated in the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in

Moscow. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.

Primarily terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian

forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Russian and

Chechen non-combatants.

Probably no more than 50 fighters at any given time.

Primarily Russia.

May receive some external assistance from foreign

mujahedin.

The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian

group that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-

Shia, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s

as a response to the Iranian Revolution. Pakistani President

Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002. In August

2002, the SSP renamed itself Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and

Musharraf re-banned the group under its new name in

November 2003. The SSP also has operated as a political

party, winning seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly.

The group’s activities range from organizing political rallies

calling for Shia to be declared non-Muslims to

assassinating prominent Shia leaders. The group was responsible

for attacks on Shia worshippers in May 2004,

when at least 50 people were killed.

The SSP may have approximately 3,000 to 6,000 trained

activists who carry out various kinds of sectarian activities.

The SSP has influence in all four provinces of Pakistan. It

is considered to be one of the most powerful sectarian

groups in the country.

The SSP reportedly receives significant funding from Saudi

Arabia through wealthy private donors in Pakistan. Funds

also are acquired from other sources, including other

Sunni extremist groups, madrassas, and contributions by

political groups.

The SPIR is one of three terrorist groups affiliated with

Chechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry out

the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October

2002. The SPIR has had at least seven commanders

since it was founded in the late 1990s. Movsar Barayev,

who led and was killed during the theater standoff, was

the first publicly identified leader. The group continues to

conduct guerrilla operations in Chechnya under the leadership

of the current leader, Amir Aslan, whose true

identity is not known. Designated under EO 13224 in

February 2003.

Primarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces. Has

also been involved in various hostage and ransom operations,

including the execution of ethnic Chechens who

have collaborated with Russian authorities.

Probably no more than 100 fighters at any given time.

Primarily Russia.

May receive some external assistance from foreign

mujahedin.

The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as the

Jama’a Combattante Tunisienne, seeks to establish an Islamic

regime in Tunisia and has targeted US and Western

interests. The group is an offshoot of the banned Tunisian

Islamist movement, an-Nahda. Founded around 2000

by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the TCG

has drawn members from the Tunisian diaspora in Europe

and elsewhere. It has lost some of its leadership,

but may still exist, particularly in Western Europe. Belgian

authorities arrested Maaroufi in late 2001 and

sentenced him to six years in prison in 2003 for his role

in the assassination of anti-Taliban commander Ahmad

Shah Massoud two days before 9/11. The TCG was designated

under EO 13224 in October 2002. Historically,

the group has been associated with al-Qa’ida as well.

Members also have ties to other North African extremist

groups. The TCG was designated for sanctions under

UNSCR 1333 in December 2000.

Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support

network of the broader international jihadist movement.

According to European press reports, TCG members or

affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified

documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan.

Some TCG associates were suspected of

planning an attack against the US, Algerian, and Tunisian

diplomatic missions in Rome in April 2001. Some members

reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group

for Call and Combat.

Unknown.

Western Europe and Afghanistan.

Unknown.

MRTA is a traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement

formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of

the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group active

in the 1960s. It aims to establish a Marxist regime and to

rid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily US and Japanese

influence). Peru’s counterterrorist program has

diminished the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks,

and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprisonment

or deaths of senior leaders, and the loss of leftist

support.

Previously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes,

and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drastically.

In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupied

the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima and held

72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forces

stormed the residence in April 1997, rescuing all but one

of the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group members,

including the remaining leaders. The group has not

conducted a significant terrorist operation since and appears

more focused on obtaining the release of imprisoned

MRTA members, although there are reports of low-level

rebuilding efforts.

Believed to be no more than 100 members, consisting

largely of young fighters who lack leadership skills and

experience.

Peru, with supporters throughout Latin America and Western

Europe. Controls no territory.

None.

Turkish Hizballah is a Kurdish Sunni Islamic terrorist organization

that arose in the early 1980s in response to

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s secularist approach

of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Turkish

Hizballah spent its first 10 years fighting the PKK, accusing

the group of atrocities against Muslims in southeastern

Turkey, where Turkish Hizballah seeks to establish an independent

Islamic state.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Turkish Hizballah, which is

unrelated to Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base

and modus operandi from killing PKK militants to conducting

low-level bombings against liquor stores,

bordellos, and other establishments the organization considered

“anti-Islamic.” In January 2000, Turkish security

forces killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish

Hizballah, in a shootout at a safe house in Istanbul. The

incident sparked a year-long series of counterterrorist operations

against the group that resulted in the detention

of some 2,000 individuals; authorities arrested several

hundred of those on criminal charges. At the same time,

police recovered nearly 70 bodies of Turkish and Kurdish

businessmen and journalists that Turkish Hizballah had

tortured and brutally murdered during the mid-to-late

1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish interests

in January 2001, when its operatives assassinated the

Diyarbakir police chief in the group’s most sophisticated

operation to date. Turkish Hizballah did not conduct a

major operation in 2003 or 2004 and probably is focusing

on recruitment, fundraising, and reorganization.

Possibly a few hundred members and several thousand

supporters.

Primarily the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey.

It is widely believed that Turkey’s security apparatus originally

backed Turkish Hizballah to help the Turkish

Government combat the PKK. Alternative views are that

the Turkish Government turned a blind eye to Turkish

Hizballah’s activities because its primary targets were PKK

members and supporters, or that the Government simply

had to prioritize scarce resources and was unable to wage

war on both groups simultaneously. Allegations of collusion

have never been laid to rest, and the Government of

Turkey continues to issue denials. Turkish Hizballah also

is suspected of having ties with Iran, although there is not

sufficient evidence to establish a link.

The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest Loyalist

paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in

1971 as an umbrella organization for Loyalist paramilitary

groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF).

Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA membership.

The UDA/UFF declared a series of cease-fires

between 1994 and 1998. In September 2001, the UDA/

UFF’s Inner Council withdrew its support for Northern

Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement. The following month,

after a series of murders, bombings, and street violence,

the British Government ruled the UDA/UFF’s cease-fire

defunct. The dissolution of the organization’s political

wing, the Ulster Democratic Party, soon followed. In January

2002, however, the UDA created the Ulster Political

Research Group to serve in a similar capacity. Designated

under EO 13224 in December 2001.

The UDA/UFF has evolved into a criminal organization

deeply involved in drug trafficking and other

moneymaking criminal activities through six largely independent

“brigades.” It has also been involved in murder,

shootings, arson, and assaults. According to the International

Monitoring Commission, “the UDA has the capacity

to launch serious, if crude, attacks.” Some UDA activities

have been of a sectarian nature directed at the Catholic

community, aimed at what are sometimes described as

‘soft’ targets, and often have taken place at the interface

between the Protestant and Catholic communities, especially

in Belfast. The organization continues to be involved

in targeting individual Catholics and has undertaken attacks

against retired and serving prison officers. The group

has also been involved in a violent internecine war with

other Loyalist paramilitary groups for the past several years.

In February 2003, the UDA/UFF declared a 12-month

cease-fire, but refused to decommission its arsenal until

Republican groups did likewise and emphasized its continued

disagreement with the Good Friday accords. The

cease-fire has been extended. Even though numerous attacks

on Catholics were blamed on the group, the UDA/

UFF did not claim credit for any attacks, and in August

2003 reiterated its intention to remain militarily inactive.

Estimates vary from 2,000 to 5,000 members, with several

hundred active in paramilitary operations.

Northern Ireland.

Unknown.

The UVF is a Loyalist terrorist group formed in 1966 to

oppose liberal reforms in Northern Ireland that members

feared would lead to unification of Ireland. The group

adopted the name of an earlier organization formed in

1912 to combat Home Rule for Ireland. The UVF’s goal

is to maintain Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK;

to that end it has killed some 550 persons since 1966.

The UVF and its offshoots have been responsible for some

of the most vicious attacks of “The Troubles,” including

horrific sectarian killings like those perpetrated in the

1970s by the UVF-affiliated “Shankill Butchers.” In October

1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command,

which included the UVF, declared a cease-fire, and the

UVF’s political wing, the Progressive Unionist Party, has

played an active role in the peace process. Despite the

cease-fire, the organization has been involved in a series

of bloody feuds with other Loyalist paramilitary organizations.

The Red Hand Commando is linked to the UVF.

The UVF has been active in Belfast and the border areas

of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings,

assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and

robberies. UVF members have been linked to recent racial

attacks on minorities; however, these assaults were

reportedly not authorized by the UVF leadership. On

occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of

its attacks. Targets include nationalist civilians, Republican

paramilitary groups, and, on occasion, rival Loyalist

paramilitary groups. The UVF is a relatively disciplined

organization with a centralized command. The UVF leadership

continues to observe a cease-fire.

Unclear, but probably several hundred supporters, with

a smaller number of hard-core activists. Police

counterterrorist operations and internal feuding have reduced

the group’s strength and capabilities.

Northern Ireland. Some support on the UK mainland.

Suspected in the past of receiving funds and arms from

sympathizers overseas.

Northeast India’s most prominent insurgent group, ULFA

— an ethnic secessionist organization in the Indian state

of Assam, bordering Bangladesh and Bhutan — was

founded on April 7, 1979 at Rang Ghar, during agitation

organized by the state’s powerful students’ union. The

group’s objective is an independent Assam, reflected in

its ideology of “Oikya, Biplab, Mukti” (“Unity, Revolution,

Freedom”). ULFA enjoyed widespread support in

upper Assam in its initial years, especially in 1985-1992.

ULFA’s kidnappings, killings and extortion led New Delhi

to ban the group and start a military offensive against it in

1990, which forced it to go underground. ULFA began

to lose popularity in the late 1990s after it increasingly

targeted civilians, including a prominent NGO activist.

It lost further support for its anti-Indian stand during the

1999 Kargil War.

ULFA trains, finances and equips cadres for a “liberation

struggle” while extortion helps finance military training

and weapons purchases. ULFA conducts hit and run operations

on security forces in Assam, selective

assassinations, and explosions in public places. During

the 1980s-1990s ULFA undertook a series of abductions

and murders, particularly of businessmen. In 2000, ULFA

assassinated an Assam state minister. In 2003, ULFA killed

more than 60 “outsiders” in Assam, mainly residents of

the bordering state of Bihar. Following the December

2003 Bhutanese Army’s attack on ULFA camps in Bhutan,

the group is believed to have suffered a setback. Some

important ULFA functionaries surrendered in Assam, but

incidents of violence, though of a lesser magnitude than

in the past, continue. On August 14, one civilian was

killed and 18 others injured when ULFA militants triggered

a grenade blast inside a cinema hall at Gauripur in

Dhubri district. The next day, at an Indian Independence

Day event, a bomb blast in Dhemaji killed an estimated

13 people, including 6 children, and injured 21.

ULFA’s earlier numbers (3,000 plus) dropped following

the December 2003 attack on its camps in Bhutan. Total

cadre strength now is estimated at 700.

ULFA is active in the state of Assam, and its workers are

believed to transit (and sometimes conduct operations in)

parts of neighboring Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and

Nagaland. All ULFA camps in Bhutan are reportedly demolished.

The group may have linkages with other ethnic

insurgent groups active in neighboring states.

ULFA reportedly procures and trades in arms with other

Northeast Indian groups, and receives aid from unknown

external sources.